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The 1990s saw the digital games industry adopt similar commercial strategies to the cultural 
industry which for 80 years has been most closely associated with the process of globalisation – the 
Hollywood-based movie industry. The major console players, Sony, Nintendo and more recently Microsoft, 
expanded on a global scale, vertically and horizontally integrating through alliances and take-overs as they 
sought to control hardware, content development, publishing and distribution. Moreover the relationship 
between the two industries has become increasingly symbiotic. Vivendi Universal has moved into the 
exploitation of both game and film assets on a global scale and would seem to exemplify what we 
understand by contemporary globalisation. This paper considers globalisation through an analysis of the 
movie and digital game industries both globally and from the perspective of a small country like Ireland 
which has a high level of cinema attendance and game sales but is struggling to establish domestic movie 
and game industries.  
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1. Introduction 
The genesis of this paper lies in the contention by both authors that the film and digital games 
industries whilst producing quite distinct products, increasingly resemble each other at a structural level. 
Both these global media industries operate in competitive but unregulated markets and under these 
conditions they are becoming more concentrated over time and developing into oligopolies with sufficient 
market power to manipulate individual, particularly small, markets. It is our view that there are important 
lessons to be learnt from a more in-depth examination of these industries in relation to the continuing 
political movement to deregulate media industries and include them in world free trade negotiations, and in 
relation to counter movements to maintain a diversity of media content produced by regional, national and 
independent actors. 
Both the film and digital game industries are dominated by a small number of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), which develop product in various locales and then exploit economies of scale and 
scope to distribute this product globally. They also create and participate in global systems that are 
relatively autonomous from national policy/regulatory oversight. While globalisation theorists within 
cultural studies celebrate the global flow of people, products and symbolic messages, from a political 
economy of the media perspective the development of highly concentrated systems of symbolic production 
may have complex, and not always positive, economic and cultural consequences for small cultures and 
markets. This paper explores in detail the impact that global film and game corporations have on the 
production and distribution of independent film and games producers in the Irish context. It then raises 
some questions as to the adequacy of current, largely Anglo-Saxon, globalisation theories to describe this 
complex empirical reality. 
2.0 Globalisation  
 One might be forgiven for thinking that transnational corporations (TNCs) invented globalisation 
and that the term simply refers to the relatively recent phenomenon whereby companies have taken 
advantage of new telecommunications and computing technologies to expand their production and 
consumption networks beyond national boundaries. However, this is a very economistic conceptualisation. 
Within cultural and communications studies globalisation is regarded as a multi-dimensional process with a 
much longer history [13]. For Robertson and Tomlinson globalisation is bound up with modernity, 
emerging in the early fifteenth century and accelerating rapidly from the 1880s to the 1920s [18] [24]. For 
these authors globalisation is a process whereby societies become more interconnected and interdependent 
at a number of levels through the flow of products, people, finance and through the establishment of 
international agencies, global competition and international law. Appadurai explicitly identifies as part of 
these flows "repertoires of images and information, the flows which are produced and distributed by 
newspapers, magazines, television and film [4:7].’ Together these constitute what he terms the global 
"mediascape".i In short there is a cultural component to be taken into account in considering the 
globalisation process. 
John Tomlinson, who focuses on the cultural dimension of globalisation, adopts a relatively 
optimistic approach to the siting of power in this context. He warns against conflating culture with the 
communication and information technologies through which symbolic images are transmitted. He stresses 
that the media form only one small part of the process by which cultural meaning is constructed, arguing 
that cultural texts must be considered in relation to the mundane and ordinary activities of everyday life 
[24:19]1. In order to understand the impact of changes in the media on culture we must place mediated 
culture in the context of real lived culture: 
 
…local direct experience-as the ‘immediate environment’ within which the self develops – can be 
argued to have a certain existential priority in people’s lives. Mediated experience by contrast, 
because of its distanciated and ‘refractory’ nature, is ‘likely to bear a rather tenuous, intermittent 
and selective relation to the self’… thus though people do incorporate televisual experience into 
their routine daily local ‘experience mix’...it remains, for the majority, stubbornly separate from 
the experience that come from ‘closer to home [24:178]. 
 
Tomlinson is clearly critical of dependency/cultural imperialism/cultural homogenisation theories 
questioning their reduction of culture to the media and their implicit acceptance of media effects while 
ignoring almost two decades of active audience research. He also questions the conflation of globalisation 
with westernisation and the assumption that the political economic power of transnationals is accompanied 
                                                          
1 In reality the media is narrowed to telephones and television in his explication. 
by an ideological power to define cultural reality. While he concedes that transnational corporations are not 
‘innocent in the shaping of global culture’ [24:85] he warns against the assumption that cultural and 
ideological impacts flow from the global distribution of uniform cultural goods. His understanding of 
global culture and the role of the media points more to the opening up of alternative ‘lifeworlds’, the 
deterritorialisation of culture, i.e. the erosion of any direct relationship between culture and both 
geographical and social places and the hybridisation (i.e. intermingling) of cultures. He stops short of 
celebrating contemporary cultural life as merely post-modern diversity by admitting that 'hybridisation' 
must be used with an awareness of power and the inequalities which characterise its distribution. But while 
agreeing that hybridity is never power-neutral Tomlinson also argues (drawing particularly on some Latin 
American writing) that the process is not unilinear and that many formerly dominant cultures are now 
experiencing cultural hybridity from within. For him deterritorialisation and hybridity are both dialectical 
processes and must be viewed in relation to a culture’s ability to reassert and re-embed itself.  
Most academics today reject any notion that a pre-meditated ideologically motivated cultural 
imperialism drives contemporary globalisation or that global media companies aim to culturally colonise 
more authentic cultures. It is argued that we are experiencing not cultural homogenisation but merely the 
spread and rise to dominance of one form of transnational capitalism that has complex cultural 
consequences. Given the pervasive ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of globalisation, the discrediting of the cultural 
imperialist critique and the post-modern image of cultural playfulness one might wonder if there is still a 
rationale for critically analysing media flows and responses to them that go beyond the individual active 
user. 
We believe that the answer is definitively in the affirmative. The potential power of active 
audiences does not lie simply in their ability to reject or negotiate meaning in given products but also their 
ability to produce alternative products, their access to distribution networks and their combined purchasing 
power. These are clear political economic issues: as Nicholas Garnham notes, to study power in the media 
is to be concerned with who ‘has access to what communicative resources and what they can do with them 
[6:39].’  
 
An examination of media producers/distributors is neither to return to cultural imperialist debates 
which mistook the media for culture nor to ignore the agency of users. Rather it is a call to examine the 
relative distribution of power between producers and consumers and the relative importance of access to 
production in relation to access to distribution. Recent trends whereby transnational media corporations are 
increasingly allowed to concentrate, assert themselves in production and distribution segments of the value 
chain and exploit cultural goods globally may be reducing cultural diversity in certain forms of media 
content despite the efforts of localisation teams, regulatory bodies and alternative media groups. A concern 
for media content which is blind to the plurality of race, ethnicity, gender and class of different people, 
even allowing for the fact that the media are only one form of cultural contact, is not a call for national or 
cultural protectionism but rather a call to examine if there is space for producers of alternative messages to 
be heard. This is even more pertinent in the film and digital game industries given that the goods that these 
industries produce are pervasive, the costs of production are so high and their activities are subject to very 
light forms of regulation.  
 In this respect it is apparent from a literature review on globalisation that the term means different 
things to different people and is used to serve different interests. Critics like Ferguson argue that the 
‘myths’ underlying the discourse about globalisation are nothing more than thinly veiled justifications for 
the activities of those institutions and corporations most likely to gain financially from open access to 
global markets [5]. Some critics use the term to describe historical and contemporary trends while others 
use it more in a prescriptive and normative fashion. Some describe the term in optimistic terms related to 
increasing global consciousness and interconnectedness while others fear the effects of commodification 
especially on less commodifiable cultural forms. What is clearly needed is a historically informed 
understanding of the complexity and dialectical nature of globalisation which is aware of the positive and 
negative aspects of the process, informed by empirical analysis and alert to the relative power of corporate 
structures and individuals/groups. This paper is a contribution to this understanding. 
 
3.0  Key Characteristics of the Film and the Digital Games Industries.  
 
For over a decade now, popular forums such as "Wired" magazine have asserted the inevitability 
of some kind of corporate convergence between the film and digital games industries going so far as to 
designate the new industry as "Siliwood". The rationale for this was largely based on technologically 
determinist assumptions that the ongoing shift to a digital mode of production in the film industry would 
end the distinction between filmic and digital games texts at an "atomic" level. Although such assertions 
may reflect wishful thinking more than a realistic appraisal of the probable trajectories of the two 
industries, it is undeniable that the last decade has witnessed increasing numbers of movie to game and 
game to movie adaptations.  What makes such adaptations such an attractive option from the perspective of 
those film and games companies who licence properties from, respectively, games and film media?  
To begin answering we will rehearse some elementary information/media economics. Both the 
film and digital games industries conform to what Bernard Miege terms the “editorial model” of media 
organisation (Miege quoted in Garnham, 2000, 51). Nicholas Garnham’s description of that editorial model 
is worth reproducing in full because of the extent to which it will inform our analysis below: 
 
Editorial produces individual cultural goods – books, records, films etc. – financed largely by 
direct sale to the end consumer where the problem is (a) the management of highly skilled creative 
labour working under artisanal conditions, and (b) the uncertainty of demand. Because the nature 
of the product demands constant renewal – new books, new recordings, new films – for which 
demand is highly unpredictable, it is necessary to exploit economies of scope through managing 
what Miege calls a catalogue. In an economy of hits and flops you can only survive if you produce 
a range of products wide enough to ensure high enough statistical probability of achieving the one 
on ten hit. It is control of the catalogue and its distribution that is crucial and much of the direct 
labour can be subcontracted to ‘freelancers’ (Garnham, 2000, 51-52). 
 
Garnham’s description offers a theoretical context that we will return to below to discuss the 
impact of globalisation on cultural production in smaller/less developed countries and regions. But for the 
present let us focus on the implications of his reference to the uncertainty of demand for cultural output 
from editorial model producers. This uncertainty is accounted for by Garnham’s point about the nature of 
the product demanding constant renewal. In order to appeal to potential consumers, each new film, book 
and record must appear different (and implicitly better) from those previously distributed/published. In 
other words, as Garnham puts it, “the use value of the information industries, unlike other industries, is 
based on the production of novelty (Garnham, 2000, 55).” This stress on novelty has further corollaries 
captured in another Garnham formulation:  
 
If I already possess a piece of information, by definition I no longer need to purchase it again. It 
also means that I don’t know if I want to consumer a given information product until I have 
consumed it. My decision to buy cannot be based on previous knowledge of the product. This 
means that unlike most industrial production demand is very unpredictable (2000, 55). (Italics 
added) 
 
It is this unpredictability that begins to address the question put at the start of this section. 
Although the positions of the seven Hollywood majors in cinema and the big three in games may appear 
impregnable this is sometimes illusory: in film MGM/UA have teetered on the brink of disaster for the past 
two decades. Meanwhile in the digital games industry speculation abounds as to whether there is space for 
three proprietary and competing platforms in the industry and if not which will win the console battle. In an 
effort to defend their entrenched positions dominant players in both industries have invested increasing 
resources in the production of (technically at least) better titles than those produced by actual or putative 
competition. This has lead to a dramatic increase in the costs of production on individual titles (a fact which 
of itself constitutes a barrier to new market entrants). The average negative cost of a Hollywood film is now 
just over $US50m with a further $25m spent on prints and advertising [14]. Against this average US box 
office revenues for individual films reached just $17m in 2001. Such figures are not yet characteristic of the 
game industry but here too there have been dramatic increases in the past decade as the technological tools 
and platforms develop and production teams and production budgets grow. The latest PlayStation title from 
Sony-owned Naughty Dog took $12 million and up to 36 people to develop. Final Fantasy X is said to have 
cost over $35 million to develop.ii This is an extraordinary level of investment to place in products with 
such an unpredictable market demand. 
 Although increasing production costs are meant to improve the chances of a given text in the 
market they also raise the levels of risk associated with individual texts. Games developer Naughty Dog co-
founder Jason Rubin, notes that “there is always a possibility of bankruptcy. It’s like the movie industry 
now” [22]. As a consequence in both industries the dominant players are less willing to accept previous 
levels of risk on individual titles. The question is how such risk can be offset? 
 
Our answer comes in two parts: the second discussed below relates to the structure of the two 
industries and ultimately to the site of power within them. But the first directly addresses the question put at 
the start of this section: what accounts for the interest of film companies in digital game texts and of digital 
games companies in films? The answer is that one method of reducing unpredictability is to look for texts 
which have previously demonstrated pulling power in other markets or what film historian Thomas Schatz 
terms "pre-sold" properties [19]. When Nicholas Garnham notes the importance of novelty in determining 
the utility of media and information products he hits on a key difficulty in selling media and information 
products: potential consumers of information products can’t “try out” those products since in the act of 
doing so they are actually consuming the product.  
In this context the attraction of the pre-sold property is that audiences are more likely to be 
familiar with the text (based on exposure to it in another media form) even though they have not consumed 
it in its adapted form: "you've read the book, now see the film." This is a long established strategy in the 
film business - even the foundation text of American narrative cinema, DW Griffiths's 1915 "Birth of a 
Nation" was based on a bestselling novel.  
It is also an increasingly significant strategy in the digital games business. An analysis of the top 
100 chart all format games in the UK for 2001 saw a mixture of original titles, of popular franchises, of 
conversions from one platform to another and of license led games.  Specialist game publishers and 
developers are licensing real world elements like David Beckham (secured by Rage), Starsky and Hutch 
(secured by Empire) and established brands like Who Wants To Be A Millionaire, Toy Story and Harry 
Potter. A recent Screen Digest report cited on the ELSPA website notes that; 
 
Last year, licence-based titles accounted for 45 per cent of the all-formats UK top 
100, up from 28 per cent in 1997 and 42.5 per cent in 1999…Overall, the licence looks set to 
increase its power over the business as publishers use intellectual properties to buy consumers' 
attention and throw marketing money at these products in a bid to return their investment [20]. 
 
Thus Hollywood now routinely licences films for exploitation as games. This occurs in a rather 
different guise than in the early 1990s when products were licensed between departments within the same 
Hollywood studios. The Consumer Products Divisions of the various Hollywood studios now license their 
filmic properties to specialist game development studios who understand how to make good games. This is 
even the case with Vivendi Universal Publishing the massive French games publisher formed through the 
acquisition by Vivendi of Seagram, owner of Universal film and music in 2001. The deal brought Universal 
Interactive (UI) under the same corporate roof as Vivendi's Blizzard Entertainment and Sierra Interactive. 
Vivendi Universal is now actively seeking to exploit its established filmic properties in game form. This 
may appear to constitute a return to Siliwood era since UI itself will in 2002 publish games based on recent 
Universal releases The Scorpion King and The Mummy Returns but also on 1982's The Thing and 1993's 
Jurassic Park [2]. Significantly, however, UI's involvment in these games has been limited to licencing the 
properties and publishing the games - the actual development has been outsourced to third party developers 
such as Wayforward Technologies, Blitz Games and Computer Artworks. Moreover the actual practice of 
licensing has also developed somewhat from the early 1990s. Games licencing today is conducted less as 
an ‘add-on’ to a game and more in conjunction with the development of the game. Consequently there are 
fewer design restrictions placed on the licensed games: developers now have access to film sets and the 
main characters of a film or the image, voice and signature of a major sports star.  
The logic of licencing presold properties also explains the ongoing interest of Hollywood studios 
in adapting games properties: the various editions of Tomb Raider were reputedly played by 100 million 
people before the filmic adaptation was released. As (again reputedly) the fifth most recognised female 
figure on the planet, Lara Croft’s status as a pre-sold property was indisputable.  Having said that the 
overall experience of game-based movies demonstrates the limits of licensing: only eight have been made 
since 1993 and all but two have been box office disasters. This may owe something to the fact that in terms 
of unit sales, cinema is a much more significant industry than digital games – the various installments of 
Final Fantasy, one of the most successful games franchises sold a remarkable 33 million units worldwide 
between 1987 and 2001 [11]. This sounds less impressive when one realises that the Fellowship of the Ring 
was seen by a roughly similar number of people in US theatres alone in the six months from December 
2001 to May 2002. In short even the most successful games text will have a much smaller level of general 
public awareness than even a moderately performing film. 
Nonetheless the net effect of all this cross-licencing is to make producing for one industry 
increasingly dependent on acquiring a property from another industry.  
It is the second strategy for coping with unpredictability that leads our discussion towards 
globalisation. To increase their chances of scoring a hit in an inherently unpredictable market companies 
must produce a portfolio of titles, a demand which favours those market players with access to significant 
resources.iii Yet achieving scale in production is worthless unless that product reaches the market. Thus as 
again Nicholas Garnham points out "the ability to produce, and even more important distribute, a 
significant product range is crucial. In the medium to long term the large operator will always defeat the 
small” (Italics added). 
Garnham's stress on the special role of distribution is important because a strong distribution 
position within a given industry may ultimately become a greater source of dominance than strength in 
production. Pursuit of a portfolio strategy doesn't necessarily imply that all the products in that portfolio 
should be created by the production arm of a given media company: the strategy will work just as well with 
products acquired from external producers or a combination of externally supplied and inhouse products. In 
effect then distribution may well be the single most important element of any given vertically integrated 
company. 
The histories of both the film and digital games industries bear out the logic outlined above. In the 
global film market the dual tendencies towards market concentration (or scale) and vertical integration 
were established almost from the outset. The Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) was established in 
1908 as a production combine which attempted to use their control of patents relating to cameras and 
projectors to determine which companies could enter the production market. The MPPC then created an 
alliance of nationwide distributors, which it then gradually subsumed into a single company, General Film, 
servicing the entire United States. Only a US Department of Justice antitrust suit broke up the attempt to 
establish oligopoly power at the level of both production and distribution [23]. The antitrust suit 
notwithstanding the concentration and integration tendencies reasserted themselves with the eight firms that 
came to constitute “the studio system” from the 1920s to the 1940s, dominating the entire US industry 
through their vertical integration into production, distribution and exhibition activities.  
Like the MPPC before them, the studios also faced and lost a Department of Justice antitrust 
action and were forced to divest themselves of their domestic exhibition arms. Having lost guaranteed 
outlets for their product, the studios also scaled back their production activities, becoming in effect 
primarily distributors. This shift did not substantially alter their dominance of the industry making manifest 
the importance of control of the distribution function. This change in any case mirrored the distribution 
focus of studio activity outside the US: during the First World War as European film factories were turned 
over to munitions production, US-based producers stepped in to fill the sudden dearth of product copper-
fastening their hold on their domestic markets but additionally establishing distribution offices throughout 
South America, and to a lesser extent Asia. When the European market re-opened after the war Hollywood 
extended its distribution and production dominance to that region through production/ distribution alliances 
with now weakened European studios such as UFA in Germany. As a consequence by the mid-1920s, the 
vertically integrated Hollywood studio system had established a global distribution network which the 
worlds other film industries were unable to match (or even gain access to).  
In this regard the dominance of the major US distributors in international markets was shored up 
after the second world war by the inclusion (at the behest of the US government) in the 1948 General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) of an article limiting national signatories’ cinema market 
regulatory powers to introducing minimum periods of screen time for domestic films [7]. Significantly, 
Article IV of the agreement ruled out measures which would have specifically targeted another nation’s 
cinema exports. In effect then as the Hollywood majors developed into Trans-National Corporations, they 
were able to operate in a global cinema market which was largely unregulated (especially in comparison 
with national regulations on the operation, ownership and dominance in the broadcasting and press 
industries). Thus the single largest distributor operating in Europe today is United International Pictures, 
co-owned by Universal and Paramount and which distributes their pictures across Europe along with those 
of Dreamworks and MGM/UA. 
Scale, vertical integration and the central role of distribution are also features of the digital games 
industry at the beginning of the 21st century although the specific configuration of the industry differs 
somewhat from film. In 2001 in addition to holding effectively 100% of the hardware market between 
them, Nintendo, Sony and Sega were also heavily involved in software/content development and controlled 
56% of the rapidly expanding market in publishing gamesiv. Furthermore because of their size they were 
also able to exert considerable pressure over retailers in relation to percentage returns. Although Sega have 
subsequently pulled out of the hardware market they were immediately replaced by Microsoft (via the 
release of the X-box console) who had already established themselves as a PC games publisher.  
This degree of integration owes much to the mid-80s entry to the American market of Nintendo 
and Sega who adopted strategies designed to avoid a repeat of the all but total collapse of the US industry a 
few years earlier. That collapse had owed much to a problem of oversupply of poor quality games from 
third-party developers. As J.C. Herz puts it consumers became "unable to distinguish the pearls from the 
dross" and headed "straight for the sale bins, forcing even high quality games into a vicious cycle of 
discounting and loss [8]. Consequently Nintendo and Sega’s primary motivation for vertical integration 
was to control the quality and quantity of games developed for their digital game consoles through strict 
licensing arrangements. 
The Nintendo case study illustrates how these strategies worked. Introduced in 1986 Nintendo's 
Famicon/Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) had significant computer power and a lock-out chip to 
prevent third party games being developed for it. Nintendo sold this hardware at cost price, half that price 
of its competitors (Sheff 1993:35). Company strategy identified hardware merely as a tool to sell software: 
the more quality games available the larger the installed base of consoles. Consequently Nintendo invested 
heavily in developing both hardware systems (arcade and domestic), but also in software development via 
internal development teams (in order to control the quality and quantity of content and reap maximum 
return on investment in their hardware systems) and exclusive contracts with third party publishers2. Their 
control of the console system through the lock-out chip meant that they could demand high royalties on 
                                                          
2 Exclusivity deals meant that the game could only appear on Nintendo’s platforms.  
third party software sales and operate a very strict licensing policy. In effect Nintendo (and Sega) used 
licencing to determine the flow and quality of software for their platforms, ensuring a longer shelf life for 
their hardware and ultimately higher returns. From 1983 to 1995 the Sega and Nintendo operation of 
similar business models saw off the threat of companies like Atari, Matsushita and NEC.  
Similar strategies were adopted by Sony when it launched the Playstation in 1995 (a decision for 
which  Nintendo were directly – albeit unintentionally - responsiblev). To ensure availability of quality 
content for their new platform, Sony became a content developer applying the expertise gained from an 
alliance with Namco, a Japanese arcade games company, and UK based game developer Psygnosis [1]. As 
a consequence, by 1999 Sony was also the leading publisher in Europe of console games. Alvisi et al also 
suggest, however, that Sony’s success was based on their strategy to depend more on licencing third party 
developers rather than inhouse teams. Especially significant was the 1996 release by Eidos of Tomb Raider, 
an adventure game created for the PlayStation One. An exclusivity deal ensured that the next three Tomb 
Raider games appeared only on the Sony PlayStation. Furthermore in 1997 Square Soft announced that 
Final Fantasy VII would be released solely on the PlayStation and not on Nintendo’s systems as 
previously. It sold 6 million copies worldwide.  
Sony almost single-handedly expanded the consumer market for digital video games (Poole 2000). 
The Playstation rapidly outstripped sales of both the Nintendo and Sega platforms, establishing a 
worldwide market. By 1999 almost 38% of Sony Corporation profits stemmed from its videogames 
division, Sony Computer Entertainment [1].  
The “big three” in the console company league have very effectively parlayed their vertical 
integration into industry control. Nintendo, Sony and now Microsoft operate at a scale that dwarfs even the 
$1.5 billion in annual revenues of the largest independent publisher, Electronic Arts (although not those of 
French owned giant Vivendi Universal Publishing). This logic of scale (as a prerequisite for portfolio 
creation) has clearly not been lost on independent games publishers, who have adopted one of two 
strategies to compete with the big three: acquiring other publishers and/or buying into development 
companies. The latter strategy has allowed them to have greater control over concepts, production 
processes and deadlines [3]. As publishing companies get more risk averse and more cautious venture 
capitalists are favouring larger publishing companies who in turn are favouring larger development studios. 
For the present there remains more competition in the digital games distribution sector than in the film 
industry - globally the industry has restructured around a core of between 10 and 20 major publishers – but 
it’s unlikely that this will remain the case for long. During 2000 more than six specialist game publishers 
were bought out by larger specialist publishers including GT Interactive and Hasbro Interactive by 
Infogrames, Neversoft and Raven by Activision, Dreamworks Interactive, Kesmai, PlayNation and 
Pogo.com by Electronic Arts [16]. By 2001 four of the top ten independent publishers were from the US, 
three from Japan and three from France. French publishers in particular have been busy growing through 
acquisitions with Infogrames, Titus and UbiSoft all going public during the 1990s and using this money to 
acquire other publishers and developers [10].  
What is equally significant is that games development studios, while growing, remain on the 
whole small to medium sized companies with 35-60 employees. While there is pressure on them to grow, 
and some have taken on publishing functions as well, in the main the relationship between development 
studios and their publishers remains one of unequal power. Cornford et al [3] have noted that in order to 
understand the digital games industry one has to analyse not just the site of production, but rather the power 
differential between large finance/publishing houses and development studios. While venture capital is 
becoming a source of revenue studios still largely depend on the big three console companies or specialist 
publishers to finance, market and distribute their games.  
Similarly through control of global film distribution networks but also through the substantial 
production budgets at their disposal the Hollywood majors maintain a dominant relationship with other 
smaller distributors and independent production companies. Even the Spielberg-Katzenberg-Geffen owned 
Dreamworks must look to UIP (co-owned by Universal and Paramount) when seeking to get their pictures 
into distribution outside the US. Meanwhile although there are literally thousands of film production 
companies within the US, only those with first-look deals with the major distributors can realistically hope 
to see their pictures financed on a regular basis. In both industries then the a small number of distributors or 
publishers play dominant roles in the value chain, shouldering much of the investment risk in developing 
new projects but also taking most of the profits. 
Returning again to our original question what are the implications of the increasing focus on 
licencing and the concentration of ownership within the distribution/publishing sectors of the two 
industries. The first point to stress, of course is that cross-licencing is developing the mutual 
interdependence of the two industries, as exemplified by Sony's and Vivendi-Universal's operation across 
both industries. However, perhaps the most significant point in terms of the scope for diversity in 
production is that the rise of cross-licencing means that producing for one industry characterised by a high 
degree of concentration of market power is increasingly dependent on acquiring a property from another 
industry characterised by a high degree of concentration of market power. In effect then oligopoly in one 
cultural “property” industry reduces scope to enter another culture industry oligopoly and the concentration 
of power in both industries becomes mutually reinforcing. What implications does this together with 
concentration of power in distribution have for cultural production outside these corporations? 
 
5.1 Hollywood and the Digital Games Industries: implications for small countries 
 
In the section below we attempt to answer the last question posed above by considering the case of cultural 
production in Ireland, a country which on a per capita basis avidly consumes both film and games texts but 




Irish per capita cinema attendance is the largest in western Europe (with the singular exception of 
Iceland), currently running at 4.5 admissions per annum [12]. This has expanded dramatically over the past 
15 years aided both by new investment in multiplex cinemas and more recently by the general economic 
growth. Similarly the Irish rent out more videos per head of population than any other European country 
(again with the exception of Iceland) and 85% of Irish homes have VCRs [12]. At a distribution level the 
domestic industry is dominated by the Hollywood majors, all of whom (Sony, UIP, Fox, and Buena Vista) 
maintain offices in Dublin (although these are generally subordinate to their London counterparts since the 
Irish market is still largely treated as region of the UK market).  
Similarly with regard to games consumption, Ireland (according to Sony) has the highest per 
capita rate of PlayStation ownership outside Japan at 38%. Sony has approximately 80 % market share in 
Ireland and their strength in the market is reflected in the company having an office in Dublin and a 
regional marketing network. These figures are confirmed by the Amárach Consumer Trendwatch quarterly 
report conducted in June/July 2001 which found that of 1,000 adults surveyed between 15-74 years 32 
percent owned a games console with the most popular being PSone followed by PS2. For retailers Sony’s 
presence on the ground has been crucial in the company’s success in Ireland. The launch of the PS2 in 2000 
saw the company spending over £1 million (IRL) on a campaign on Irish television, national and regional 
print, in night clubs, a press launch and launch of a game rating system in Ireland. Although similar figures 
are  unavailable for the sales of the various Nintendo, Sega and Microsoft platforms, both independent and 
other retail stores have growing games sections and the available data would suggest that while the market 
is small it is lucrative.  
Given this it would reasonable to expect that Ireland might have a thriving film and digital games 
production sector. With regards to cinema, however, the small scale of the Irish market has made sustaining 
a purely commercial cinema impossible. Consequently virtually no indigenous filmmaking activity took 
place until the 1980s and control over filmic representations of Ireland to the world lay outside the state. 
Yet the cultural significance of cinema was sufficiently acknowledged by the state that the situation was 
partially addressed in 1981 with the establishment of the Irish Film Board. In its six year existence the 
Board part-funded 10 features as well as a series of short and experimental films. The Board's activities 
were suspended in 1987 during a period of economic austerity but recommenced in 1993 in the wake of a 
series of reports arguing that investment in the film industry would generate a net return to the Irish 
Exchequer. Simultaneously, a hitherto little-used film investment tax break, Section 481 (then called 
Section 35) was expanded to allow greater investment sums and to allow private investors to become 
involved in funding productions. 
The net effect of this was to bring about a remarkable transformation in the Irish film production 
sector. From a situation in the early 1990s where perhaps 3-4 films per annum were shot in Ireland, the 
level of activity quickly grew to 15-20 pictures each year, made up of a mix of co-productions and overseas 
and indigenous productions.  
This contrasts with the Irish games industry. The growth of the digital games industry globally 
from 1972, the growing revenues and profile of the sector and the multiplication of platforms has sparked 
entrepreneurial interest in Ireland since 1987. A survey of the industry in 2001, however, found that none 
of the companies established in the late 1980s or 1990s have survived until today with the companies in the 
main lasting only five years [9]. Indeed the lifecycle of Irish companies corresponds closely with the 
lifecycle of different game platforms. By 2002 Ireland had one PC developer, seven developers of game 
shorts for mobiles, Internet and digital TV and two companies who provide specialist services to the games 
industry.  There was no console developer and no publisher. Significantly therefore Ireland has no presence 
in the crucial console development sector or in the distribution business.  
Crucially it was found that global shifts in the sector notably increasing development costs and 
decreasing numbers of publishers posed significant barriers to entry for Irish start-ups. Many of them faced 
significant problems persuading console or independent publishers that they were capable of developing a 
game and worth investing in. In order to persuade publishers that a company is capable of developing a 
game an advanced demo is needed and this in turn imposes considerable capital and labour costs. As a 
result contemporary start-ups are in the main capitalised using venture capital, debt and client funding and 
targeting online markets.  
Clearly Ireland consumes games but has almost no presence in the global production of games 
except for one company who is developing an online strategy game. In contrast to the film industry, this 
dichotomy has attracted almost no institutional response in Ireland from industrial development, cultural 
institutions or educational institutions. There are no degree courses in game design and only one college 
offers a game related course. The only practical action has come from the handful of individuals who either 
emigrate to work in the UK and US development industry or are content to remain in Ireland and develop 
tools and content in their spare time which they then distribute free over the internet. This last, of course,  
has frequently been identified as the technical panacea that would overcome such inequalities in 
distribution power. Yet even online distribution necessitates that the developer or publisher has the 
resources to market and service final users and as a result scale is becoming an important prerequisite. 
Yet the question of distribution also has negative implications for Irish film industry. The increase 
in production has not translated into an a concomitant increase in the number of films in distribution. Thus 
the apparent turnaround in production has not been reflected in the cinema attendance in Ireland. In point of 
fact for the years of the 1990s for which figures are available, the dominance of US pictures at the Irish box 
office has actually increased, accounting in 1995 for 90% of all admissions. Indeed of the 28 wholly 
indigenously-produced films (i.e. discounting overseas productions and co-productions) made in Ireland 
between 1990 and 2001, just seven received any kind of release outside the Irish Republic. None of those 
seven was released in more than one other country. What’s more, although figures relating to the release of 
those 28 films are not publicly available, it’s clear that the majority of those 28 have received either no 
release or a very limited release (i.e. one print in one cinema for one week) even within Ireland itself. In 
short it remains the case that even after the massive increases in production that Irish producers are unable 
to break into a distribution system which remains dominated by global-scale players. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications for theory  
 
Both old and new media corporations have demonstrated their ability to erase national barriers to 
the creation of global media markets. As we have demonstrated above, control of distribution/publishing in 
the fields of cinema/digital games, has allowed a handful of largely unregulated TNCs to establish 
dominant global market positions in these industries (or in the case of Sony in both). In Ireland these global 
players have erected considerable barriers to entry for domestic cinema and digital games production 
companies despite national and independent attempts to circumvent them.  
The consequences of such domination are reflected in the inability of independent Irish films to 
reach sufficient audiences to recoup costs and the failure of Irish digital game companies to obtain 
publishing deals in the lucrative console and PC games market. The shape and content of the messages 
distributed in Ireland is dictated by players with agendas remote from the producers and audiences in 
Ireland. Indeed it has been sobering to see how small independent exhibition spaces have their agendas 
dictated by larger global players and how local operators are forced to redesign their concepts to conform 
with international genres and international distribution schedules. This is not to say that some of these 
genres are not satisfying to Irish audiences; but it is to say that there could be so much more but market 
forces alone will not provide it.vi  Current structures mean that the range of alternative discourses about 
how people in Ireland perceive and understand the world through film and games is controlled by a handful 
of TNCs who have little interest in challenging the status quo and there is little to no space for independent 
producers. 
This is not to suggest that the range of responses to this dominance must necessarily be informed 
by a protectionist logic. Ireland has for generations come into contact with external cultures, from the 
Normans, to the Vikings to the English, and to varying levels has incorporated or borrowed from these 
cultures. The country has a long history of being involved in global flows of people, goods, and the arts, 
from early Christianity to the Foreign Direct Investment policies of the 1960s. With the development of 
immigration in recent years Ireland is experiencing cultural transformations at many levels. At the same 
time it would be myopic to embrace the positive elements of cultural hybridisation and deterritorialisation 
while ignoring the wounds inflicted by years of hegemonic economic, political and cultural domination 
imposed by imperialism and colonialism.  
For the present authors the unequal access to distribution and exhibition resources in these 
industries signals an important and unequal power relationship which globalisation and free trade debates 
rarely take into account. While in the theoretical realms of neo-classical economics, all companies have the 
same potential to compete, in reality in an increasingly globalised world a small number of Anglo-
Saxon/Japanese companies control the production and distribution channels and erect artificial barriers to 
entry for others either through scale or licensing agreements. As these trends accelerate audience choice 
becomes more and more limited and content innovation in the industries more stymied. That two media 
production sectors co-exist in the Irish state with a situation where high levels of cinema/digital games 
consumption is dominated by products produced overseas (mainly US, UK and Japanese) would be comic 
were it not for the fact that - to a greater or lesser extent - both industries are involved in the production of 
products embodying meaning. 
In recent years the attention given to unequal power relationships within the globalisation 
literature has evaporated in part because of the overwhelming dominance of the rhetoric of the free-market 
- implying that consumer choice represents a meaningful exercise of power on the part of individuals - and 
in part due to the rise of active audience research which showed that audiences often resist and reinvent 
media texts to suit their own needs. Indeed as cultural studies would argue the media are only one means of 
cultural exchange and their power should not be overstated. These theoretical and political standpoints 
however fail, we believe, to place enough emphasis on the unequal relationship between user agency and 
socially available spaces in which to exercise this agency. This leads us to suggest that current debates on 
globalisation requires some "re-insertion" of questions of power and perhaps we need to revisit and revise 
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i In point of fact Appadurai adduces five independent dimensions to these global cultural flows. In addition 
to mediascapes he points to ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes. 
ii The contrast with the early industry norm could not be more stark. Shigeru Miyamoto singlehandedly 
designed Nintendo’s first hit. Donkey Kong (1981), his first game, starred a carpenter, a gorilla and a 
damsel in distress. The same designer was also behind the first Super Mario game, which followed the 
adventures of a plumber and his brother through fantastic worlds to rescue a princess [21:55] . 
iii See for example Martin Dale in The Movie Game on the economics of operating on the scale of a 
Hollywood major. 
iv One which is expected to grow by 26% in 2002 [10]. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
v Nintendo developed a relationship with Sony in the early 1990s with a view to developing a CD-ROM 
add on for the Super Nintendo Entertainment System (SNES); codenamed PlayStation [17:18]. The deal 
floundered, partly because Sony insisted on maintaining the licensing rights for all games and partly 
because Nintendo had also done a deal with Philips to develop a similar system. Despite a 1992 attempt to 
agree on common CD standards, the Sony/Nintendo/Philips CD technology project was abandoned and in 
the aftermath Sony went on to redevelop the PlayStation (PS) based on proprietary technology [15, 21]. 
vi Indeed research by one of the authors has found that the digital games industry has failed to attract new 
audiences outside the core male audience specifically because it relies on tried and trusted concepts.  
